Introduction
China's pace of real economic growth and transformation into a global trading power over the past three decades has been unprecedented. However, development of its fi nancial sector has been more gradual and irregular. Despite evident progress in the size and depth of the fi nancial sector, state-controlled banks and institutions dominate fi nancial markets, many asset prices are heavily managed, and a myriad of regulations and controls still aff ect international fi nancial transactions. Th is uneven pattern of development raises the question of whether liberalization of China's fi nancial sector and the "internationalization" of its currency, the renminbi, will ever catch up with the real side of the economy, allowing China to stand among other major economic powers as a world fi nancial center.
"Internationalization" of a currency generally involves permitting its use by domestic and foreign agents in international trade and fi nancial transactions both inside and outside of a country's borders. Full internationalization of the renminbi (rmb) is a tall order for a country that currently maintains numerous fi nancial controls and heavily regulates domestic and cross-border fi nancial transactions. Nonetheless, Chinese leaders have made concerted eff orts to encourage greater international use of the rmb since the G-20 summit in November 2008 when Chinese President Hu Jintao called for "a new international fi nancial order that is fair, just, inclusive, and orderly, " and China subsequently began to encourage more use of its currency in international trade, swap arrangements between central banks, and bank deposits and bond issuances in Hong Kong. 1 Th ough Prasad and Ye (2012) view the eff ects of these eff orts on use of the rmb as modest in size so far, they regard them as symbolically important in signaling the shift in China's ambitions for the renminbi's future role in the global economy and international monetary system.
Views about the prospects for internationalization of the rmb vary. Some analysts (Ito, 2011) argue that an rmb currency bloc will soon emerge in Asia, within which the rmb would be used widely as a transactions currency for trade and fi nance, as well as treated as a reserve currency by other central banks. Other analysts predict a more gradual and slower pace for internationalization of the rmb in regional and global transactions. McCauley (2011) , for example, maintains that the Chinese authorities have only just begun the process of permitting the rmb to become an international currency, in terms of allowing residents and non-residents alike to use the currency to trade, invest, borrow, and invoice outside of China. Prasad and Ye (2011) analyze the growing internationalization of the rmb through its use in the denomination and settlement of cross-border trade and fi nancial transactions, the likelihood and timing of its convertibility, and the prospects for its greater utilization as a reserve currency. Th ey also describe how rmb trade settlement in Hong Kong has expanded rapidly, the issuance of renminbi-denominated bonds both in Hong Kong and the Mainland is picking up, and signs that some central banks are holding rmb-denominated assets in their foreign exchange reserve portfolios. Nonetheless, they conclude that while internationalization of the rmb is steadily growing, it is a long way from attaining full convertibility or meeting other prerequisites for achieving reserve currency status.
Still others see relatively little internationalization of the rmb to date and are pessimistic about further developments, as it would undermine China's highly managed fi nancial and monetary system. In this view, rmb internationalization cannot be undertaken without domestic fi nancial reforms that more closely link the domestic fi nancial system as well as domestic monetary and exchange rate policies to the international fi nancial system.
A large body of literature has addressed various aspects of the policy challenges faced by China as it seeks to sequence capital-account opening and currency internationalization with other policies, such as exchange-rate fl exibility and fi nancial market development (see Girardin, 2011; Glick and Hutchison, 2010; IMF, 2011; Ma et al., 2011; Lee et al., 2011; Ma et al., 2011; Ogawa and Simizu, 2011; Pongsaporn and Unteroberdoerster, 2011) . Less well-discussed is how the gradual process of fi nancial liberalization and China's drive toward internationalization of the rmb has aff ected its East Asian regional neighbors. Given the sheer size and dynamism of China's economy, greater fi nancial openness and internationalization of the rmb inevitably will have repercussions for the global economy, and of course even more so for its regional trade and fi nancial partners in East Asia.
Th e objective of this chapter is to evaluate how changes in China's fi nancial system, liberalization of capital controls, and the process of currency internationalization have aff ected fi nancial markets in other East Asian economies. In particular, we examine the extent to which the fi nancial market changes and openness in China have aff ected the cross-country links of fi nancial asset returns within the region. We examine whether linkages have grown stronger over time, either because (i) capital account liberalization in China has permitted more fi nancial capital fl ows and arbitrage and hence greater cross-country fi nancial integration, or (ii) stronger real sector linkages, trade fl ows, and business cycle synchronization within the region as a result of China's emergence as an engine of economic growth have indirectly linked fi nancial asset returns in the region even in the absence of fi nancial capital fl ows and asset market arbitrage. We measure fi nancial market integration by several metrics and, to the extent that we fi nd such linkages, we attempt to determine whether they are generated by direct fi nancial market connections or by indirect real economic linkages. Th e main theme and conclusion of this chapter is that domestic fi nancial development in China has been modest and internationalization of the currency and liberalization of capital controls to date very limited. As a result, substantial diff erences in some fi nancial asset returns remain between China and its neighbors. In particular, we fi nd that short-term fi nancial asset returns, as measured by interbank interest rates, are essentially unlinked within the region, while only weak linkages may be detected in longer-term interest rates, as measured by fi ve-year government bond rates. Much stronger linkages, however, appear in equity markets. We argue that the dominant factor linking equity markets in China with other East Asian economies is not equity market arbitrage working through capital markets, but rather strengthening trade relationships and synchronization of economic activity associated with the emergence of China as an engine of growth within the region.
Th e chapter is organized as follows. Section 25.2 summarizes recent steps China has taken to open its capital account. Section 25.3 reviews the empirical literature on fi nancial linkages between China and its East Asian neighbors. Section 25.4 presents new empirical evidence on linkages between China and East Asia that analyzes short-run linkages between exchange rates, interest rate, and equity markets using regression analysis, as well as long-run linkages using cointegration analysis. We conclude with some general observations about policy implications of the analysis for East Asia countries and how they are likely to be infl uenced increasingly by China's fi nancial policies in the coming years.
Capital Control Liberalization in China
China has pursued a cautious path toward greater fi nancial openness. Although tax benefi ts and other incentives have been used to promote inward foreign direct investment, other forms of infl ows, particularly portfolio capital and external debt, have been traditionally discouraged. Capital controls have also played a role in protecting the banking system from external competition by restricting the entry of foreign banks and by making it harder for capital to fl ow out of the country. As China slowly liberalizes its capital account, it faces a key challenge of maintaining domestic monetary and price stability. 2 Large balance of payments surpluses through both the current and fi nancial accounts have put upward pressure on the currency. To limit appreciation of the renminbi, Chinese monetary authorities have intervened in the foreign exchange market and accumulated massive amounts of foreign reserve. As a result, China's holdings of foreign reserves have risen from $140 billion in 1997 to over $3.2 trillion at the end of 2011.
Th is reserve buildup has raised concerns about monetary and infl ation stability in China, as both money aggregates and prices have grown faster. A not-so-distant memory is the excessive expansion of the monetary base, money, and credit between 1991 and 1994-when these aggregates grew at times by over 40 percent per annumresulting in high infl ation, with CPI rising near 30 percent at its peak. 3 Th e foreign reserve boom over the past decade has similarly led to periods of very large increases in the monetary base, threatening at times a return of higher infl ation (Glick and Hutchison, 2009) .
As long as China continues to place a higher priority on exchange rate stability than on using monetary policy as a tool for macroeconomic control, China's scope for an autonomous monetary policy is constrained. Chinese monetary authorities have addressed this challenge by aggressive open-market sterilization operations as well as by raising reserve requirement ratios and employing window guidance measures. 4 As reserve accumulation continues, the confl ict between monetary and exchange rate objectives will become increasingly harder to resolve, particularly as remaining controls on capital fl ow become more diffi cult to maintain.
Capital controls, which prevent money from moving in and out of an economy easily, have helped to insulate domestic monetary policy from balance of payments surpluses. Since the start of China's reform and open-door policies, foreign direct investment (FDI) infl ows have been encouraged, while other infl ows and capital outfl ows were initially heavily controlled. 5 Non-bank Chinese residents and institutions had been prohibited from directly investing in overseas securities, though banks were permitted to invest their own dollar assets in fi xed income instruments
In recent years, China has liberalized controls on non-FDI capital fl ows very slowly. Authorized banks were allowed to transact cross-border to accommodate onshore non-bank depositors and borrowers wishing to deposit and borrow in foreign currency. China has sought to institutionalize the management of two-way portfolio fl ows through programs for so-called "qualifi ed foreign institutional investors" (QFIIs) for portfolio infl ows and "qualifi ed domestic institutional investors" (QDIIs) for portfolio outfl ows. 6 Both programs involve pre-approval procedures, quota management, foreign exchange conversion rules, instrument restrictions, and intensive reporting requirements. With the introduction of the QDII plan in 2006, China opened an offi cial channel for Chinese households and fi rms to gain access to global fi nancial markets. Appreciation pressures on the rmb have led China to encourage outfl ows through other channels, for example, by relaxing restrictions on currency conversion by domestic residents. 7 In addition, fi rms and banks have been given fl exibility to issue foreign-exchange denominated bonds in local markets and to raise their direct overseas investment.
Th ough China had tightly controlled portfolio fl ows and most external debts for a long time, there is evidence that these capital controls were leaky and had tended to become less eff ective over time even before the recent relaxation of capital controls. 8 Th e sheer magnitude of net and gross portfolio capital and "hot money" infl ows clearly cast doubt on the eff ectiveness of China's capital control regime. Moreover, as the evidence presented in Glick and Hutchison (2009) and Ma and MacCauley (2007) illustrate, despite the existence of remaining capital controls, there are many indications that China's capital account fl ows respond to market conditions, suggesting limits to the eff ectiveness of these controls. "Hot money" fl ows have apparently been responsive to expectations of rmb appreciation. Similarly, foreign exchange deposits held by Chinese households and fi rms onshore with banks in China have tracked exchange rate expectations, rising as a share of total bank deposits when the rmb was expected to depreciate and falling when the rmb was expected to appreciate.
Although, as pointed out above, permitted cross-border flows have reduced the effectiveness of China's remaining capital controls, they have not been large enough to eliminate onshore/offshore rmb yield differences. For example, McCauley (2011) examines the growing role of offshore markets for the yuan in China's strategy for financial development, arguing that policymakers are seeking to internationalize the renminbi before fully liberalizing China's capital account. He argues that rmb are building up outside of Mainland China via "carefully drilled holes" in China's capital controls. However, currency, bond, and equity markets show that these controls nonetheless continue to bind. For example, the Chinese government in 2011 successfully issued rmb-denominated bonds in Hong Kong at rates lower than those offered onshore. The differential in the prices of Chinese shares between the mainland and Hong Kong also points to the effectiveness of capital controls. Hutchison, Pasricha, and Singh (2011) measure the eff ectiveness of capital controls in China by covered interest parity deviations, using China's interbank off er rate (CHIBOR), the London Interbank Off er Rate (LIBOR for the dollar), the spot exchange rate, and the non-deliverable forward exchange rate (NDF). Th ese parity deviations, shown in Figure 25 .1 , are frequently large and indicate that a lack of integration between China's domestic (short-term) fi nancial markets and international fi nancial markets. Other work also shows that sizable onshore-off shore yield gaps persist and provides evidence on the relationships between implied forward rates, interest rates, and equity prices that indicate Chinese capital controls have been eff ective in partly "decoupling" Chinese fi nancial markets from those in the United States, Hong Kong, and elsewhere (see Cheung et al., 2006; Ma and McCauley, 2007; and Liu and Otani, 2005; McCauley, 2011; Prasad and Ye, 2012b 
Empirical Literature on China's Financial Linkages with East Asia
China's growing role in global trade and fi nancial markets has aff ected its East Asian regional neighbors. Given the sheer size and dynamism of China's economy, greater fi nancial openness and internationalization of the rmb has repercussions for the global economy, and of course even more so for its regional trade and fi nancial partners in East Asia. Several studies have investigated how these developments have aff ected asset price linkages in the region. Jang (2011), for example, analyzes the degree of fi nancial integration of China, Japan, Korea, and the United States by examining correlations of money and bond market rates as well as stock market changes using data from the early or mid 1990s through mid 2010. He fi nds that the correlations of monthly Asian money market rates with United States rates increased aft er the Asian fi nancial crisis, though China's correlation is the lowest in the group. Correspondingly, the correlation of money rates of Japan and Korea with that of China, 9 which was negative before the Asian fi nancial crisis, is now positive, as rates in the region have moved more closely with each other in recent years. He fi nds that the correlations of Japan and Korean government bond rates also increased with United States rates aft er the Asian fi nancial crisis. In contrast, China's bond rate (with data available only since 2005) does not show a signifi cant correlation with the United States aft er the crisis, though it does display positive correlations with Japan and Korea, particularly with the latter. In addition, he fi nds that stock markets in Japan, Korea, and China move more tightly with the U.S. stock market, though less so for China, aft er the Asian fi nancial crisis and also show positive correlations among themselves. Th e correlations in stock price indices in other East Asian countries also suggest a tighter interrelationship with the U.S. stock market following the Asian fi nancial crisis. Th e relatively low correlations of U.S. and China asset price changes in recent years are consistent with their diff erences in economic recoveries and infl ation concerns. 10 Jang concludes that in the last decade Asian countries have achieved remarkable progress in economic integration. However, the degree of fi nancial integration lags signifi cantly behind the degree of trade and real economy integration. Moreover, inter-regional links appear to be stronger than intra-regional links in East Asian countries. 11 A number of papers focus on co-movements of exchange rates in region. For example, Balasubramaniam, Patnaik, and Shah (2011) , following the methodology of Frankel and Wei (1994) and Frankel (2009) , estimate the eff ects of changes in the dollar, euro, yen, and rmb on individual East Asian currencies over the period October 2005 to February 2011, using the Swiss Franc as the numeraire. Th ey fi nd that the eff ect of the rmb is signifi cant only for Malaysia (from 2005 to 2007), Viet Nam (aft er 2009) and Taiwan (through the entire sample). (Somewhat ironically they fi nd that the rmb mattered more outside of East Asia, including India and Pakistan as well as many countries in Africa.) Th ese results suggest that while China has made strides in terms of achieving a major role for the rmb in international trade through the establishment of rmb settlement mechanisms and swap lines, there is relatively limited evidence of an independent eff ect of the rmb on exchange rate policies of neighboring economies. Ma and McCauley (2010) argue that it is important to consider the frequency of the data when analyzing correlations. For example, they fi nd that the co-movement of the renminbi with major currencies other than the dollar is greater at lower frequency, i.e., at weekly or monthly intervals rather than at a daily frequency. Th is suggests that the Chinese monetary authorities are trying to minimize currency fl uctuations against the dollar on a daily basis, while managing the value of the rmb vis-à-vis a basket of currencies over the longer run, particularly during the period between mid-2006 and mid-2008.
China and East Asian Asset
Returns: New Evidence
Our review of the literature on China's capital controls and increasing international fi nancial integration suggests that its domestic fi nancial development is proceeding slowly in tandem with some modest steps toward liberalization of the capital account and very limited exchange rate fl exibility. Some authors have found that China's fi nancial markets are becoming more integrated with its East Asian neighbors despite pervasive capital controls. Others argue that China's fi nancial role in East Asia is minimal, not approaching its role in regional trade and importance as a regional source of economic growth.
Exchange Rates
Despite the binding nature of capital controls, fi nancial market developments in China may still have an impact on asset prices in other East Asian economies. One factor that infl uences this linkage is the extent that exchange rates move together. Movements in the value of the rmb have been aff ected by several distinct phases of Chinese exchange rate policy since the early 1980s, as shown in Figure 25 .2 and summarized in Financial linkages between countries depend on exchange rates through interest parity. Th at is, the closer the currencies of other Asian countries are linked to China's exchange rate policies, the closer one would expect fi nancial linkages between the domestic interest rates in these economies and China. Exchange rate developments in China and selected Asia countries are shown in Figure 25 .3 . (Normalized exchange rate developments are shown in order to allow comparative analysis.) Th e most striking observation is that substantially greater exchange rate fl exibility is observed in these countries compared to China. Only a weak correspondence between China's modest exchange rate movements and those elsewhere in Asia are evident, suggesting that fi nancial linkages may also be relatively weak.
Broad Trends in Interest Rate and Equity Market Linkages
Th is sub-section analyzes co-movements between China's and East Asian fi nancial asset returns. We investigate linkages for three fi nancial assets-interbank interest rates, fi ve-year government bond interest rates, and equity prices-for Hong Kong, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Indonesia-using daily data. We consider the most fi nancially open economy in the region, Hong Kong, as a "control" region since it is tightly linked to the U.S. dollar through its currency board arrangement, has no capital controls or other impediments to cross-border movement of capital, and is a world fi nancial center. Th e other four countries are partially fi nancially open and have developed fi nancial sectors to various degrees, but it is not clear the extent to which China infl uences their domestic fi nancial asset prices. Our choice of asset price variables allows us to examine whether the degree of fi nancial linkage with China varies across asset maturities and type. Interbank interest rates are at the shortest end of the maturity spectrum and are most directly infl uenced by the central bank's policy target rate. Evidence of tight linkage of interbank rates would indicate that China has signifi cant short-run infl uence over domestic monetary policy 10,000 (Log Scale; Major National Indices) 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,500 2,000 Figure 25 .4 for interbank interest rates), Figure 25 .5 for fi ve-year bond rates) and Figure 25 .6 for equity market price levels (using a logarithmic scale). Figure 25 .4 indicates that China's interbank interest rate developments display broadly similar movements with other East Asian economies over the long run, but also show substantial diff erences in the short run. Linkages among fi ve-year bond rates, shown in Figure 25 .5 , indicate a similar pattern to that of interbank interest rates. Th e most dramatic linkages are shown in Figure 25 .6 for equity prices (plotted using a log scale for comparison purposes). Equity prices for China and all the other East Asian countries are closely linked across time.
Daily Financial Market Linkages
To complement our graphical analysis, we analyze the daily linkages of fi nancial asset prices of the same East Asian economies with China in a regression framework that controls for common shocks, represented by U.S. asset price fl uctuations. Our object is to determine whether developments in China's fi nancial markets signifi cantly infl uence fi nancial asset prices in the East Asia region, and whether the form of the exchange rate regime or degree of exchange rate fl exibility in China infl uences the strength of the transmission mechanism. Th e full sample period is June 2, 2005, through September 16, 2011, with subperiods corresponding to the exchange rate episodes identifi ed in the previous section as (1) June 2005-June 2008 (gradual appreciation), (2) July 2008-May 2010 (tight peg, narrow range), and (3) June 2010-September 2011 (very gradual appreciation). Note that China's desired degrees of exchange rate fi xity is not independent of external conditions, as the second sub-sample corresponds with the global fi nancial crisis.
Th e linkage regressions, reported in Table 25 .2 for the interbank rates, Table 25 .3 for the fi ve-year bond rates, and Table 25 .4 for the equity prices, regress each country's fi nancial asset rate against the corresponding China-U.S. rates (the U.S. rate is lagged one day due to the time zone diff erences). All interest rate variables are in fi rst diff erences, and the equity price is in log fi rst-diff erences. (All of the variables in levels were non-stationary.) Regressions with additional lags of the China and U.S. asset prices were estimated, and are available from the authors upon request; the results were almost identical to estimation results reported in the tables.
Th e results are quite striking. Interbank rates in the four East Asian countries are not infl uenced by interbank rate movements in China, regardless of the sample period (i.e., exchange rate regime), except very marginally in one instance (Taiwan over the full period, though not in any sub-sample period). Th is indicates that short-term bank funding costs and monetary policies in the region moved independently of China's fi nancial markets developments. By contrast, there is more support, albeit modest, of linkages with China for fi ve-year bond rates. In particular, there is no fi ve-year bond linkage in any sample with Hong Kong, but linkages appear in at least one sub-sample (or the full sample) for the other four economies. Linkage with Korea and Indonesia appears during the global fi nancial crisis period, when China maintained a narrow pegged exchange rate against the dollar, and Korea's and Indonesia's exchange rates depreciated sharply. (Th e linkage during this sub-sample explains the signifi cant linkage over the full sample.) No linkage is seen during the fi rst and third sub-samples. Linkages with Taiwan are seen in the fi rst sample period (carrying over to the full sample period) but not in the other two sub-samples. Linkages with Malaysia are only found in the last sub-sample.
Finally, equity market linkages between China and other East Asian economies are strong and consistent throughout the sample, regardless of the exchange rate regime. In particular, equity price movements in China are strongly correlated with equity price changes in every country and every sub-sample period, with a single exception (Malaysia in the last sub-sample). Moreover, in a number of cases, the strength of the linkage with China is stronger than the linkage with U.S. equity prices. More specifi cally, the link appears to be somewhat stronger during China's fi xed rate peg period which corresponds with the Asian fi nancial crisis.
Overall, these results suggest that China's capital controls are quite eff ective in "decoupling" fi nancial markets in the region, at least in the short-term. Th e only consistently strong and robust linkage exists with equity price movements, and these very likely are more infl uenced by direct and indirect trade linkages as opposed to fi nancial market linkages.
Long-Run Linkages
Despite our modest support for fi nancial market asset price linkages between China and East Asian economies in the short run, it is possible that longer-run relationships may be identifi ed. To this end, we consider the long-run linkage of fi ve-year bond (shown in Figure 25 .7) and equity prices between China and Korea, while controlling for fl uctuations in U.S. asset prices. We chose Korea for this analysis since Korea is the largest economy in our group of East Asian economies investigated and, from the preceding section, probably has the strongest short-run linkage with China. We consider both nominal and real monthly bond interest rate and equity prices. Th e real bond interest rate is defi ned as the nominal rate less the 12-month infl ation CPI infl ation rate. Th e (log) real equity price is defi ned as the (log of the) nominal equity price divided by the CPI price index. Our sample period begins in We employ cointegration methodology to test whether asset prices demonstrate longer-run co-movement over time. Two variables are cointegrated if they move together over long periods, but perhaps deviate substantially over the short-term such as during business cycles. We employ two diff erent cointegration tests-the Johansen (rank or trace test, and the eigenvalue test) system co-integration tests and the Engle-Granger single-equation cointegration test. Th ese are standard tests of cointegration (Hamilton, 1994) . We investigate the long-run linkage between China and Korea asset prices (as endogenous variables), while controlling for U.S. asset price fl uctuations (treated as a deterministic common element).
Th e tests for nominal (real) fi ve-year bond rate cointegration are reported in Table 25 .5 ( Table 25 .6 ), and the tests for nominal (real) equity price cointegration are reported in Table 25 .7 ( Table 25 .8 ). Th e left -hand-side of each table reports the Johansen tests, and the right-hand-side of each table reports the Engle-Granger cointegration tests.
We do not fi nd cointegration between asset prices in China and Korea aft er controlling for U.S. asset prices movements. Th is is a robust result. Th e null hypothesis of "no cointegration" cannot be rejected in the system estimation (Johansen rank or eigenvalue test) or single-equation test (Engel-Granger test) at the 5 percent level or better for either nominal or real interest rates or equity prices. Moreover, further cointegration tests focusing on a system of three endogenous variables (Korea, China, and the United States) give similar results. China's bond rates do not apparently have a systematic long-term linkage with fi nancial market prices in Korea. Th is result should be interpreted cautiously, however, due to the limited sample period in which Chinese fi nancial market data is available (since 2005). Th is is a very short period to unveil "long-term" relationships. Nonetheless, it is suggestive that the ultimate fi nancial 
Conclusion
Th is chapter evaluates how gradual changes in China's fi nancial system, liberalization of capital controls, and the process of fi nancial "internationalization" have aff ected fi nancial markets in other East Asian economies. In particular, we examine how fi nancial market changes in China's economy-whether driven by policy changes, market-driven developments, institutional changes, or the growing importance in the region-have infl uenced fi nancial asset prices of its East Asian neighbors. Our main conclusion is that domestic fi nancial development in China as of early 2012 have been modest and internationalization of the currency and liberalization of capital controls has been very limited. Consequently, substantial divergences remain between the onshore and off shore prices of Chinese fi nancial assets, as well as between the fi nancial assets of China and its neighbors. Short-term fi nancial asset prices, refl ected in interbank interest rates, were essentially decoupled. Weak linkages were detected in longer-term interest rates (fi ve-year bond rates). Th e strongest linkages, however, appeared in equity markets. We argue that equity market arbitrage working through capital markets was not the force driving these linkages between China and East Asia. Rather, the emergence of China as the clear regional economic power, the sheer size and dynamism of its economic activity and trading relationships, have played the dominant role in linking equity markets across the region.
Notes
1 . According to Mallaby and Wethington (2012) , during the fi rst six months of 2011, trade transactions settled in rmb totaled around $146 billion, a 13-fold increase over the same period during the previous year. By mid-2011, rmb deposits in Hong Kong equaled $85 billion, a roughly tenfold jump since Hu's 2008 statement. Th e yuan is already accepted as a form of payment in Mongolia, Pakistan, Th ailand, and Vietnam. Chinese authorities have indicated that as soon as 2015, they want the yuan to be included in the basket of major currencies that determines the value of Special Drawing Rights. 2 . For example, China in recent years has permitted limited expansion of portfolio capital fl ows through "qualifi ed investment" programs. Moreover, unoffi cial fl ows into and out of China have grown over time. 3 . Th is episode was also characterized by a sharp deterioration of asset quality, resulting in substantial increases in non-performing bank loans. 4 . See Ma, Xiandong, and Xi (2011) for a detailed discussion of the use of reserve requirement changes as a tool of monetary policy in China.
oxfordhb-9780199751990-Part-6.indd 646 oxfordhb-9780199751990-Part-6.indd 646 8/14/2013 6:09:02 PM 8/14/2013 6:09:02 PM 5 . Th e rmb has been convertible for current account transactions since December 1996, when China satisfi ed the IMF's Article VIII criteria for membership. 6 . In December 2002, QFIIs were allowed to invest in A shares and other domestic securities, subject to requirements of at least $10 billion in assets under management and prior experience. Repatriation was limited by lock-up periods on stocks of as long as one-year. New rules in September 2006 lowered the asset under management criteria to $5 billion, reduced the lock-up period to three months, lessened experience requirements, and also raised the quotas for investment in Chinese equities. Th e QDII program, launched in July 2006, permitted qualifi ed commercial banks, securities fi rms, and insurance companies in China to make limited off shore investments in foreign-currency denominated assets (restricted to fi xed income securities in the case of banks and insurance companies). More recently, in response to concerns about increased capital outfl ows as the economy has slowed, China has accelerated its approval process to allow more capital infl ows into its stock and bond markets via the QFII program. 7 . In 2007 the PBOC raised to $50 thousand the ceiling on the conversion between rmb and foreign currency by Chinese individuals. 8 . Prasad and Wei (2005a) provide an extensive chronology of capital controls over the period 1980-January 2005; Prasad and Ye (2012b) update the chronology into 2011. Th ey document the increasing openness of China's capital account in both de jure and de facto terms through selective and cautious changes, consistent with the active promotion of the rmb as an international currency. However, in most cases, they argue that constraints on capital infl ows and outfl ows have been merely relaxed rather than eliminated entirely. 9 . Th e three-month deposit rate was used for China because the lack of alternative data. 10 . He also examines deviations from uncovered interest parity, with the expected exchange rate change used in these calculations proxied by the previous period's actual change. For a related exercise analyzing real interest linkages among Pacifi c Basin countries, see Glick and Hutchison (1990) . 11 . Quantity-based measures include measurement of openness and restrictiveness in trade and fi nancial transactions, cross-border movement of capital, output and consumption correlations, and savings-investment correlations. Th ey yield similar conclusions; see Jang (2011) .
